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Abstract
This paper asks whether targeting welfare benefits to women can be effective at
changing household spending. We provide empirical evidence on this question by
using a reform to the UK tax-credit system in 2003 as a quasi-experiment. We find
that the reform caused low-income households to reallocate spending towards chil-
dren’s goods. The results further demonstrate that the effects of directing welfare
benefits to women can extend beyond child expenditures to goods that are collect-
ively consumed by all household members. Our findings are in contrast to those
from earlier studies that took place in the economic setting of 1970s UK.
JEL classifications: H31, I38, J16
1. Introduction
This paper provides new evidence on whether paying welfare benefits to women in couples
(instead of men) can change household spending patterns. This is important, as evidence
that households respond differently to transfer payments, depending on the gender of the
recipient, has implications for the design of the programs. In general, it is difficult to assess
whether the income of the male or female partner in a couple has a differential impact on
household spending as income shares are endogenous. We address this issue by exploiting a
novel reform to the UK tax-credit system in 2003 as a quasi-experiment. The reform made
the ‘carer of the children’ the recipient of a large share of a household’s tax-credit income,
which is in contrast to the pre-reform rules where the male partner could generally claim
ownership of all means-tested child payments and tax-credits.
This paper seeks to answer these three questions: i) Do families spend transfer income
differently depending on the gender of the recipient, ii) Do children benefit when welfare
benefits are paid to mothers (instead of fathers) in terms of increased household spending
on children’s goods, and at the cost of adult expenditures, iii) Do any effects extend to col-
lectively consumed goods? We use variation in the share of female benefit income in total
household benefit income generated by the 2003 UK tax-credit reform. The reform effect is
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estimated for multiple spending items using a difference-in-differences estimator that ex-
ploits the fact that low-income households are more likely to be affected by the reform,
relative to middle income households. Gregg et al. (2006) use a similar strategy when study-
ing the introduction of a UK in-work benefit—the Working Families Tax Credit, in 1999—
on household spending. However, their results do not inform us of expenditure patterns
had WFTC been paid directly to mothers instead of fathers.
The paper relates to previous research that considered redirecting transfer income asso-
ciated with a UK child benefit reform (replacing tax expenditures received by men with
transfers that went to women), which took place in the setting of the 1970s (Lundberg
et al., 1997; LPW; Ward-Batts, 2008; WB; Hotchkiss, 2005). LPW find evidence that
households shifted expenditure away from male clothing and towards female and children’s
clothing, in line with the conventional claim that women attach more weight to children’s
(and their own) welfare. An absence of randomized control trials from advanced economies
in contemporary time periods has hampered testing, whether such a relationship holds in
the setting of a modern developed economy.1
Changes to the economic and social setting since the 1970s, including increased female
employment rates and a smaller gender wage gap, mean that it is not possible to apply the
LPW results to the setting of this paper, that is, at the start of the 21st century. Thus our
main contribution is that our findings apply to an advanced economy in a recent time
period and so inform our understanding of the household decision making process as
societies develop. Separately, much of the earlier research focused on a narrow group of
adult and children’s goods for which consumption can be assigned to a particular house-
hold member (e.g., male, female, and children’s clothing). But women are also likely to
face different incentives to men to invest in other publicly-consumed household goods.
For example, gains from marriage such as housing investments may be captured by one
person if the marriage breaks down (Stevenson, 2007).2 As such, the effects of directing
benefit income to women on household spending potentially extend beyond a narrow
range of women and children’s goods that have received most attention in the literature.
In light of the above, we extend our analysis to collectively consumed household
expenditures.
In terms of the main findings, we conclude that the 2003 reform influenced spending
patterns through the intra-household distribution of income. We observe spending increases
on children’s goods (toys and games, musical instruments) and spending decreases on pri-
vate adult goods (gambling, maintenance payments). However, the strongest effects are
found on items that are consumed by all household members. Insofar as these goods are
consumed by children as well as adults, the overall effect of directing state benefits to
women on children’s consumption is unclear. Finally, we contrast our results to the LPW
and WB studies of the child benefit reforms that took place three decades ago. Explanations
are put forward for the key similarities and differences.
1 A closely-related pool of causal evidence is available in the development literature. Braido et al.
(2012) find evidence of income pooling in Brazil. In contrast, studies in various settings have shown
that children benefit when the bargaining position of women is improved; see Duflo (2000) (South
Africa); Duflo and Udry (2004) (Cote d’Ivoire); Bobonis (2009) (Mexico); and Attanasio and Lechene
(2010) (Mexico).
2 Stevenson (2007) finds that laws regarding the division of marital property at divorce affects newly-
weds’ home ownership decisions.
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The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides some background on the 2003
UK tax-credit reform before our empirical strategy is discussed in Section 3, followed by a
description of the data in Section 4. In Section 5, we provide some background to the 1970s
LPW reforms, and contrast the 1970s samples to those in this paper. The empirical results
are presented in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes. A summary of results from robustness
checks is included in Appendix 1. Full tables of robustness checks are available in the supple
mentary material.
2. Background
A reform that aimed to simplify the UK tax-credit system in 2003 provides the opportunity
to test whether redirecting state benefits from husbands to wives influences household
spending patterns in the setting of the 21st century. Tax-credits are in-work benefits that
top-up the income of poor families meeting certain employment conditions. Prior to 2003,
the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) operated in the UK and was typically paid with
male wages. In 2003, WFTC was split into two new tax credits: the Working Tax Credit
(WTC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC). In couples, while WTC was again usually paid with
male wages, CTC was redirected as a cash payment to the partner designated the ‘carer of
the children’ (usually the mother).
Tax-credit eligibility requires that at least one partner in a couple has paid employment
for at least 16 hours per week. Prior to 2003, tax credits were normally paid in the wage
packet of the partner satisfying this weekly hours requirement, unless couples requested
that the payment be made to the non-working partner. This implies three categories of tax-
credit eligible couples defined by the partner satisfying the weekly work hours condition:
the male, both partners, or the female.3 For the first group of couples, payment was typic-
ally made through the wages of the male partner. The second group of couples chose which
partner received payment, and so the mother could only receive payment with the male’s
consent. The final, smaller group of couples are atypical in that the benefit system gave the
female partner ownership of tax credits. To give an indication of the size of this final group,
for the treated group in our data they constitute 9.4%.
In April 2003, the new tax credits came into operation. The key point from the perspec-
tive of this paper is that payments of the new tax credits were divided between the partners.
In this way, the reform increases the ability of mothers in couples to lay claim to a substan-
tial share of tax-credit income. One could argue that couples have a degree of choice over
the partner designated as the ‘main carer’ since the couple indicates who this person is
when completing the tax-credit application form. However, the available tax-credit statis-
tics by gender report that in October 2003, 87% of CTC payments in couples went to the
female partner (Inland Revenue, 2003, table 7.1).4
Figure 1 illustrates the relevant features of the reform for couples with different gross
earnings. The figure takes a single-earner couple with two children and the male working
30 hours per week. It then varies gross weekly earnings (essentially varying the male wage
rate) to show how the value of tax credit entitlement changes. For a couple with set gross
weekly earnings, the impact of the reform on total tax credit income can be seen by
3 Self-employed workers were paid directly and are excluded from the estimation sample.
4 In addition to WFTC, families paying income tax could claim a small tax rebate known as the
Children’s Tax-Credit. From 2003, the Children’s Tax Credit was subsumed in CTC.
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comparing the pre-reform ‘WFTC’ schedule to the ‘Total Tax Credit Post-Reform’ sched-
ule. The amount of the post-reform tax credit income that is paid to the male partner can
be seen from the WTC schedule. For example, we see that for a couple with gross earnings
of £300 per week, WTC income is zero and the full total tax credit (of approximately £60)
is paid via CTC. Note that the long-tail of the new tax credit schedule, which occurs as a
small component of CTC (known as the family element), is not withdrawn until gross earn-
ings reach a higher threshold. A full breakdown of how the maximum amounts available in
WFTC were allocated to the new tax credits is available in the supplementary material
(Tables 2.1.2 and 2.1.3).
Lastly, there is a smaller group of low-income families who do not satisfy the tax credit
hours of work conditions. Prior to 2003, such families could instead claim equivalent pay-
ments for their children, which formed part of distinct means-tested benefits.5 The couple
would choose which partner received these payments (so the mother received payment only
with the father’s consent), but from 2003 they were subsumed in CTC. This implies that
the group of tax-credit ineligible families also experienced an intra-household transfer of in-
come from fathers to mothers as a result of the 2003 reform. This group of families consti-
tute 11.7% of the treated group of households in our estimation sample.
3. Methodology
This section details the empirical approach of the paper. We are interested to know if pay-
ing state benefits to women in couples (instead of men) affects household spending patterns,
and we use the 2003 UK tax-credit reform to give an exogenous change in the recipient of
tax credits in couples. In particular, we are interested in estimating effects separately for in-
dividual spending items that are assignable to i) children, ii) adults and iii) collectively con-
sumed goods.
Fig. 1. Total tax credit income (weekly) for a single-earner couple with two children, husband working
30 hours per week
Source: Author’s calculations based on Appendix Tables 2.1.2 and 2.1.3; x-axis truncated at 30 x na-
tional minimum wage¼ £135.
5 These benefits are Income Support and Income-based Job Seeker’s Allowance.
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The key challenge in identifying the effect of the reform is separating its impact from
other time-varying factors that may influence household spending such as price changes, in-
come shocks, or changes in tastes. Our approach to addressing this problem is to make use
of the commonly-used difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. We compare changes in
expenditure of low income households that are more likely to have been affected by the re-
form (treated group) with changes in expenditure for middle-income households who are
less likely to have been affected (control group). This approach rests on the fact that out-of-
work benefits and in-work tax credits are targeted at low-income families and are reduced
as household income increases. Taking the distribution of male take-home pay in a given
year, the treated group is defined as households in the bottom quartile, and the control
group as those in the inter-quartile range.6
Note that we use the treatment/control terminology in a somewhat extended sense as
the exact level of earnings at which a families’ tax credit entitlement reaches zero is family-
specific (depending on family size, hours of work, childcare costs), meaning that some fami-
lies assigned to the control group actually receive small amounts of tax credit and other
families assigned to the treated group will in fact be ineligible for tax credits. Our results
thus derive from differences in the intensity of treatment that each group receives.
As household expenditures follow the growth rate of the economy (i.e., growing propor-
tionally) we specify a non-linear DID model for each expenditure item (discussed below) of
interest:
yi ¼ expða þ b1di þ
Xm¼ dec
m¼f eb
b2mmm þ
Xt¼ 2005
t¼2002
b3ttt þ b4di:Iðt > 2002ÞÞ gi (1)
where yi measures weekly household expenditure, di is a binary treatment group indicator
(di¼ 1 for low income families), mm is a set of binary month of interview indicators, tt is a
set of binary year of interview indicators, Iðt > 2002Þ is a binary variable indicating the
post-reform period, and gi is a mean one-error term. To interpret the coefficients, b1 gives a
constant mean difference between the treatment and control groups, the b2’s capture sea-
sonal differences in expenditure, and the b3’s capture changes in expenditure due to sources
other than the reform, including changing prices, tastes, etc. The critical DID identifying as-
sumption is that, in the absence of the reform, the treatment and control groups follow the
same spending trends in proportional terms. That is, we assume that both the treatment
and control groups respond equally (in proportional terms) to price, income, and taste
shocks. Under this assumption, eb4  1  b4 is the treatment effect of interest and gives
the constant percentage increase in household expenditure due to the reform.
To account for the possibility that there may be differences in group-specific treatment
trends, we include a rich set of controls in the model, including controls for household com-
position and household income. The main results turn out to be relatively unaffected by the
6 Our methodology requires that male earnings be exogenous to the reform. This matter is discussed
in Section 6.3. The treatment control/threshold (bottom quartile) corresponds to the income level at
which tax credit entitlement reaches zero for a family with characteristics at the sample means
(number of children, childcare costs, and assuming eligibility for the 30-hour component of tax
credits). Households in the top quartile of the distribution are likely to differ from the treated group
considerably and are dropped from the analysis. We experiment with the definitions of the groups
in robustness checks (see Appendix 1). The groups were revealed to be stable in their composition
under the main definition (full results are included in Appendix 2).
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inclusion of the control variables. The full list of controls is discussed in Section 4. We fur-
ther implemented a number of robustness checks, the results and details of which are sum-
marized in Appendix 1. The robustness checks test the sensitivity of our results to the
following: the common trends assumption, the possibility that the groups differ in their re-
sponse to price and income shocks from a common proportional change, and the definition
of the treatment and control groups.
Further potential threats to DID designs are as follows: i) implementation/ transitional
problems, ii) other reforms taking place in the estimation period, and iii) anticipation ef-
fects. We argue that these are not important for the reform in this paper, and full details are
documented in Appendices 3 and 4.
3.1 Estimation and inference
Standard practice is to log linearize eq. (1) and estimate it by ordinary least squares (OLS).
However, the logarithmic transformation of eq. (1) raises two issues in the estimation of
the log linear model by OLS (Santos-Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). First, observations for
which expenditure is zero are dropped from the estimation sample, and this sample selec-
tion represents a source of bias.7 Second, under heteroskedasticity the parameters of log-lin-
earized models estimated by OLS lead to biased estimates of the true elasticities. To address
the above, Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue for using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood estimator (PPML) to directly estimate the model in non-linear form. Direct esti-
mation by PPML means that zero observations can be kept, and requires only mean inde-
pendence of the error term gi (and not statistical independence). We therefore estimate eq.
(1) directly by PPML. The reform could lead to changes in both the levels and proportions
of expenditure devoted to various expenditure categories. For this reason, alongside the
preferred PPML estimates, results are also presented from a linear specification for expend-
iture shares (estimated by Ordinary Least Squares).
In terms of inference, regular standard errors may overstate the precision of estimates of
a treatment effect in DID designs. Procedures to correct for this have been the subject of
fierce debate and the literature is still unsettled on how to proceed in the one-treatment-
one-control group case (Wooldridge, 2003; Donald and Lang, 2007). Bertrand et al. (2004)
show that the main source of bias arises from serial correlation. The authors present evi-
dence that the bias is largely eliminated when focusing on short time spans.
Acknowledging the above, we proceed by restricting the sample to five periods to ad-
dress serial correlation concerns and report heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. To
give further credibility to our results, we estimated placebo effects for all spending items.
None of the estimated placebo interventions were statistically significant, which we inter-
pret as evidence that within-group shocks are not a problem for inference (for details, see
robustness check one, Appendix 1). This approach is in the spirit of Abadie et al. (2010),
where the authors are able to calculate the exact distribution of treatment effects from ran-
dom placebo interventions.
3.2 Choosing spending items
Our research strategy involves testing for reform effects in multiple spending items con-
sumed by: i) children, ii) adults, or iii) collectively. For children’s goods, we consider goods
that have been used as measures of parental child investments in the literature. We expect
7 For example, in our data 62% of households report zero weekly expenditure on male clothing.
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positive reform effects for the children’s goods if they are more strongly female preferred.
We consider children’s clothing, fresh fruit and vegetables, childcare, books, newspapers
and magazines, musical instruments, toys, and games. For the private adult goods, we fol-
low LPW in choosing the following: clothing expenditures; cosmetics that we conjecture
are more extensively consumed by women in the household; takeaway meals that may rep-
resent a substitute for home production; gambling, where women are less likely to make
risky choices than men; and maintenance payments, which, if children typically reside with
the mother following divorce, are paid in respect of the male partner’s children from a for-
mer marriage, and thus reflect the male partner’s preference.
In line with the above discussion, we also contribute two new public goods that are col-
lectively consumed: spending on holidays and home improvements. Here the expected signs
are less clear. However, we conjecture that the partners of a couple will have different in-
centives about which of these goods should be provided. In particular, if the male partner
attaches some positive probability to the possibility of relationship breakdown, he would
prefer current resources to be spent on collectively-consumed goods where the benefit is im-
mediate (i.e., a holiday) rather than on home improvements from which a large part of the
benefit will be realized when he may no longer be a member of the household.
One concern is that when testing for reform effects in multiple spending categories, we
would expect a few of the effects to be statistically significant by chance. Romano et al.
(2008) review statistical approaches for dealing with multiple hypothesis testing, and com-
ment that methods that control the probability of making at least one type one error
(Family Wise Error Rate (FWE)) may be ‘playing it too safe’. That is, we may prefer to use
standard p-values and to accept the increased risk of making a type-one error for the benefit
of not missing important treatment effects where they occur. This is a popular approach.
To address concerns over multiple comparisons, we argue that we have a strong theoret-
ical basis for expecting reform effects of a particular sign, as discussed above. Finally, whilst
we present unadjusted p-values in the main tables, Appendix 1 summarizes results from
controlling the False Discovery Rate (FDR) by applying the Benjamini et al. (2006) proced-
ure across all expenditures for which effects are estimated. Given that our sample sizes are
relatively small and we give an upfront justification for the selected spending items, we con-
trol the FDR at 20% (details of implementation are included in Appendix 5).
4. Data
This paper uses expenditure data on couples by pooling the first five years of the
Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). The estimation sample consists of single-couple house-
holds (married or cohabiting) with at least one child aged 0–15, and responding to the EFS
in one of the first five years of the survey (2001–2005).8 The EFS operates on the basis of a
financial year (April–March). The sample is, therefore, made up of two pre-reform and
three post-reform years of data. It is further restricted to households where both partners
are aged 24–59, not sick or injured, not self-employed, and not in full-time education. EFS
interviews take place over a year’s time and all income and expenditure figures are ex-
pressed in December 2005 terms by applying the all-items retail price index, available from
the Office for National Statistics.
8 Households with children aged 16–18 were subject to Educational Maintenance Allowance reforms
in 2004 and are excluded from the analysis.
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Imposing the complete set of exclusions and the treatment/control group definitions in
Section 3 leaves a baseline sample of 3,757 married or cohabiting couples with children:
1,257 in the treated group, and 2,500 in the control group.
Table 1 presents characteristics of interest for each group. Statistically significant dif-
ferences are observed. Households in the low-income treatment group tend to be younger
(0.87 years for men, 1.38 for women), lower-educated (0.57 years for men, an insignifi-
cant difference for women), have larger families (0.12 extra children), less likely to be
married (11 percentage points), and considerably more likely to be in social housing
(20 percentage points). The differences in region of residence (not presented) are generally
small and statistically insignificant. Insofar as expenditures are likely to be affected by
family demographics, we include a full set of controls in the main regressions. We include
controls to capture differences in expenditure by the following: the number of children by
age and sex (continuous variables for the number of children of each sex aged 0–1, 2–4,
5–15); parental age (linear terms plus square and cubic terms); parental education (dum-
mies for male and female education, i.e., low, medium, or high); a continuous household
income variable, an indicator for living in social housing, and 12 regions of residence
dummies.
Table 1. Summary statistics by treatment and control group
Controls Low-income treated‡ High-income control§ Difference
Age:
Male partner 37.54 38.41 20.87***
Female partner 34.90 36.28 21.38***
Age left education:
Male partner 16.82 17.40 20.57***
Female partner 17.33 17.54 20.20
Number of children:
Total 1.93 1.80 0.12***
Age 0–4 0.62 0.60 0.02
Age 5–15 1.31 1.21 0.10**
Housing and marriage:
Social housing 0.27 0.07 0.20***
Married 0.76 0.87 20.11***
Labour market:
Household income \\ ¶ 435.27 613.22 2177.95***
Employed (Male) 0.79 0.99 20.21***
Employed (Female) 0.64 0.80 20.17***
Work hours (Male) 30.46 40.12 29.66***
Work hours (Female) 18.17 21.10 22.93***
Number of households: 1,252 2,505
Notes:
†Standard errors(robust) in parentheses. *p< .10, **p< .05, ***p< .01.
‡Treated group formed of households in the bottom quartile of the year-specific net male income distribution.
§Control group formed of households in the inter-quartile range of the year-specific net male income
distribution.
\\ £per week (December 2005 prices).
¶Wagesþ investment incomeþ social security benefits - taxes.
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The main reform effects of interest correspond to the spending items discussed above.
Table 2 shows the pre-reform expenditure means for the spending items grouped according
to private adult goods, children’s goods, and collectively-consumed goods. For an examin-
ation of treatment and control trends for the spending items centered at the time of the re-
form, see Figs 2.1 and 2.2 in Appendix 2.
5. Comparison to 1970s sample
LPW exploit changes to the UK Child Benefit in the 1970s to demonstrate that redirecting
transfer income from men to women in couples had an impact on expenditure benefiting
children and women. Prior to 1977, child amounts in the benefit system were paid through
a tax allowance (typically meaning higher take-home pay to the father). This allowance
was phased out and replaced in 1979 with a non-taxable payment made directly to the
mother. LPW find that expenditure on children’s as well as women’s clothing rose relative
to spending on men’s clothing. WB confirms the clothing findings, and further finds that
the fraction of income devoted to toys, pocket money, and restaurant and takeaway meals
all increase, whilst a ‘men’s tobacco’ category (consisting of cigars, pipe tobacco, and snuff
products) sees a decrease.
Table 2. Pre-reform summary statistics by treatment and control group
Low-income treated† High-income control‡
Pre-reform expenditure Level Share Level Share
Private adult goods
Women’s clothes 9.37 (18.60) 0.0191 (0.034) 12.66 (23.11) 0.0193 (0.030)
Men’s clothes 6.01 (15.49) 0.0123 (0.030) 8.48 (19.71) 0.0129 (0.029)
Cosmetics 7.25 (9.39) 0.0158 (0.018) 9.99 (10.89) 0.0165 (0.017)
Takeaway meals 5.70 (7.51) 0.0138 (0.019) 6.16 (7.57) 0.0108 (0.014)
Gambling 2.99 (6.12) 0.0069 (0.014) 2.87 (5.67) 0.0052 (0.011)
Maintenance payments 1.91 (11.07) 0.0042 (0.023) 2.08 (12.14) 0.0032 (0.018)
Child-related goods
Children’s clothing 8.70 (14.93) 0.0189 (0.029) 10.20 (14.38) 0.0174 (0.025)
Fresh fruit/vegetables 4.18 (3.80) 0.0106 (0.012) 5.54 (4.29) 0.0099 (0.008)
Childcare 4.23 (17.97) 0.0073 (0.029) 10.88 (39.68) 0.0146 (0.047)
Books 4.13 (4.91) 0.0098 (0.012) 5.16 (6.64) 0.0089 (0.010)
Toys 4.33 (10.73) 0.0091 (0.019) 6.45 (13.27) 0.0104 (0.022)
Musical instruments 0.12 (1.48) 0.0002 (0.003) 0.62 (6.56) 0.0009 (0.009)
Collectively consumed household goods
Holiday 3.34 (11.24) 0.0069 (0.022) 5.31 (14.78) 0.0084 (0.023)
Home improvements 1.31 (9.31) 0.0026 (0.018) 7.89 (96.79) 0.0059 (0.044)
Number of households: 527 1052
Notes:
*Standard deviations in parentheses.
**Levels expressed in £per week (December 2005 prices).
†Treated group formed of households in the bottom quartile of the year-specific net male income distribution.
‡Control group formed of households in the inter-quartile range of the year-specific net male income
distribution.
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We calculate that the average CTC claim for a two-child family in our sample represents
approximately 8% of total weekly household expenditure in 2003. It is interesting to point
out that this figure lines up closely with the WB and LPW 1970s samples, where the intra-
household transfer in their papers corresponds to 6% of the average total household ex-
penditures (based on calculations from Ward-Batts, 2008).
One difference with the 1970s reforms is that Child Benefit payments are universal,
whereas the 2003 reform targeted low-income families only. LPW and WB both estimate
the overall effect of the 1970s reforms, but their results do not tell us if the magnitude of
the treatment effect differs across subgroups. If low-income households showed the stron-
gest response to the reforms, then the results from the earlier studies would represent a
lower bound for the effect of the reforms on low-income households’ expenditures. As
such, the difference between the findings of the earlier studies and the results in this paper
could be interpreted as a lower bound for the change in the effects on low-income
households.
It is informative to compare the characteristics of our treated group of couples to those
reported by WB for the 1970s sample. Table 3 confirms that there have been considerable
changes in the social and economic setting in the UK since the 1970s. Couples in the current
paper are substantially more likely to have a female in employment (64% vs. 48%) but are
similar in terms of ages. Conditional on having at most three children, the 1970s sample
has a larger share of two- and three-child families. In the current paper, we observe higher
Table 3. Comparison of sample to WB’s 1970s sample
2001–2005 sample
1970s sample (treated group)
Female employed 48.2 64
Male age 36.5 37.54
Female age 33.9 34.9
Number of Children:
1 child 33.4 37.38
2 child 48.4 41.37
3 child 18.2 14.86
3þ children – 6.39
N 15,753 1252
Expenditure ratios†
Children/men’s clothing:
One child 0.97 1.23
Two child 1.63 2.46
Three child 2.2 2.74
Women’s/men’s clothing:
One child 1.7 2.35
Two child 1.6 3.82
Three child 1.77 1.78
Gender wage ratio‡ 69 76
Notes:
†Means from LPW table 3.
‡Figures from Myck and Paull (2004). Ratio of average hourly wages
for full time workers (female/male).
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ratios of child to male clothing expenditure across all three family sizes reported. For ex-
ample, for a two-child family the ratio increased from 1.63 in the 1970s to 2.46 at the start
of the 21st century. Similarly, the ratio of women’s to male clothing has increased for one-
and two-child families. Also, the table reports differences in the gender average hourly
wage ratio (women’s wage/men’s wage). The ratio has increased from 69% in 1979 to
76% in 2000.
Taken together, these simple descriptive statistics show that there have been important
changes within couples across the two compared periods, and the starting position of
women and children in 2003 appears to be stronger than in the 1970s.
6. Results
6.1 Private adult and collectively consumed household goods
Panel A of Table 4 presents the estimated reform effects for the six private adult goods,
whereas panel B shows estimates for the two collectively consumed household goods. In
order to explore the effects of receiving a greater intensity of treatment, columns 5–8 re-
move the top-earning one-fifth of the treated group from the estimation sample. While this
definition of the treated group focuses better on the most affected households, the associ-
ated cost is that the treated and control groups now differ more in terms of their observable
and unobservable characteristics. Results in line with the main findings would, however, be
reassuring.9
Starting with the private adult goods, reassuringly, we see coefficient estimates that
are stable in sign across the specifications and estimation methods. Evidence of important
reform effects is found amongst the parent goods. For gambling payments, the preferred
PPML estimates in column 1 show a statistically significant reduction in gambling ex-
penditure. The effect becomes more precisely estimated when the household-level con-
trols are added to the model, and implies a reduction in spending due to the reform of -
34.2%, calculated as expðbb4Þ  1. A statistically significant effect of a similar magnitude
is found for the model with controls in the smaller high-treatment intensity sample, al-
though the effects for expenditure shares, while of the same sign, are never statistically
significant.
Maintenance payments typically represent a transfer from men to their former partners
and children, and as such the new female partner is likely to prefer these to be lower,
whereas the male partner may wish to continue to support his children from his former re-
lationship (and perhaps his former partner). We find results in line with this interpretation
where we see that the treated group reduces spending in this area, relative to the control,
after the introduction of the new tax credits. Coefficients are consistently negative across
the columns and become larger in absolute terms and statistically significant in columns
5–8 when focusing on the most intensely treated households. The findings are robust to the
inclusion of the control variables. The PPML results with controls in column 2 imply a re-
form effect of -40.6%. To put the magnitude of this effect into context, Ermisch and
Pronzato (2008) find in their sample of re-partnered British men that a 10 percentage point
increase in the female income share reduces the share of household income devoted to
maintenance payments by 0.0037.
9 A similar robustness check is performed that removes the lowest earning households from the con-
trol group (for details, see robustness check 2, Appendix 1.)
P. FISHER 11
 at A
lbert Slom
an Library, U
niversity of Essex on January 13, 2016
http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
T
a
b
le
4
.
E
st
im
a
te
s
o
f
th
e
re
fo
rm
e
ff
e
ct
o
n
p
ri
v
a
te
a
d
u
lt
a
n
d
co
ll
e
ct
iv
e
ly
co
n
su
m
e
d
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
g
o
o
d
s
F
u
ll
sa
m
p
le
H
ig
h
-t
re
a
tm
en
t
in
te
n
si
ty
sa
m
p
le
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
:
P
P
M
L
þ
co
n
tr
o
ls
S
h
a
re
s
þ
co
n
tr
o
ls
P
P
M
L
þ
co
n
tr
o
ls
S
h
a
re
s
þ
co
n
tr
o
ls
A
.
P
ri
v
a
te
A
d
u
lt
G
o
o
d
s
W
o
m
en
’s
cl
o
th
es
0
.1
0
4
0
.1
3
6
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
6
5
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
(0
.1
3
0
)
(0
.1
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.1
3
7
)
(0
.1
3
5
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
M
en
’s
cl
o
th
es
0
.0
4
2
0
.0
4
6
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
5
8
0
.0
5
9
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
(0
.1
7
3
)
(0
.1
7
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.1
9
4
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
C
o
sm
et
ic
s
a
n
d
re
la
te
d
0
.0
6
5
0
.0
4
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
5
5
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
8
6
)
(0
.0
8
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
9
7
)
(0
.0
9
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
T
a
k
ea
w
a
y
m
ea
ls
0
.1
1
8
0
.1
2
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.1
4
0
0
.1
3
7
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
*
(0
.0
8
8
)
(0
.0
8
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
9
4
)
(0
.0
9
3
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
G
a
m
b
li
n
g
2
0
.5
1
5
*
2
0
.4
1
8
*
*
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
1
0
.4
5
6
2
0
.3
8
0
*
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(0
.2
8
5
)
(0
.1
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.2
9
8
)
(0
.2
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
M
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
o
r
se
p
a
ra
ti
o
n
p
a
y
m
en
t
0
.5
7
6
0
.5
2
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
2
0
.9
3
7
*
2
0
.8
5
3
*
2
0
.0
0
3
*
2
0
.0
0
3
*
(0
.4
2
8
)
(0
.4
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.4
9
9
)
(0
.4
7
8
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
1
)
B
.
C
o
ll
ec
ti
v
el
y
co
n
su
m
ed
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
g
o
o
d
s
H
o
li
d
a
y
0
.3
0
1
0
.3
1
8
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
2
2
0
.5
6
8
*
*
2
0
.5
5
5
*
*
2
0
.0
0
4
*
*
2
0
.0
0
3
*
*
(0
.2
3
4
)
(0
.2
2
4
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.2
5
7
)
(0
.2
4
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
H
o
m
e
im
p
ro
v
em
en
ts
2
.6
0
4
*
*
*
2
.4
7
3
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
5
*
*
2
.6
0
1
*
*
*
2
.4
2
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
*
0
.0
0
6
*
(0
.7
0
7
)
(0
.6
3
7
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.7
7
3
)
(0
.6
5
8
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.0
0
3
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
3
,7
5
7
3
,7
5
7
3
,7
5
7
3
,7
5
7
3
,5
0
9
3
,5
0
9
3
,5
0
9
3
,5
0
9
N
o
te
s:
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
(r
o
b
u
st
)
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
*
p
<
0
.1
0
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
.
M
o
d
el
s
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
o
f
y
ea
r
a
n
d
m
o
n
th
o
f
in
te
rv
ie
w
d
u
m
m
ie
s,
a
d
is
p
o
sa
b
le
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
in
co
m
e
v
a
ri
-
a
b
le
,
a
tr
ea
tm
en
t
st
a
tu
s
in
d
ic
a
to
r
a
n
d
a
p
o
st
-r
ef
o
rm
in
d
ic
a
to
r
x
tr
ea
tm
en
t
st
a
tu
s
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
(c
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
p
re
se
n
te
d
).
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
a
re
a
s
fo
ll
o
w
:
a
fu
ll
-s
et
o
f
re
g
io
n
d
u
m
m
ie
s;
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
m
a
le
a
n
d
fe
m
a
le
ch
il
d
re
n
re
si
d
in
g
in
th
e
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
in
a
g
e
ca
te
g
o
ri
es
:
0
–
1
,
2
–
4
,
a
n
d
5
–
1
5
;
a
n
in
d
ic
a
to
r
fo
r
re
si
d
in
g
in
so
ci
a
l
h
o
u
si
n
g
;
co
n
tr
o
ls
fo
r
p
a
re
n
ta
l
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:
a
g
e,
a
g
e
sq
u
a
re
d
,
a
g
e
cu
b
ed
,
a
n
d
a
g
e
le
ft
fu
ll
-t
im
e
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
(g
re
a
te
r
th
a
n
a
g
e
1
6
a
n
d
le
ss
th
a
n
2
1
y
ea
rs
o
ld
;
g
re
a
te
r
th
a
n
2
1
y
ea
rs
o
ld
).
12 BRITISH TAX CREDIT SIMPLIFICATION
 at A
lbert Slom
an Library, U
niversity of Essex on January 13, 2016
http://oep.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
The central result presented in the LPW study of the 1970s child benefit reforms was
statistically significant increases in the ratio of women’s to men’s clothing. We are therefore
particularly interested to see how adult clothing expenditure changed following the reform
at the start of the 21st century. For women’s clothing, we see small positive but highly insig-
nificant reform effects for both the preferred PPML results and models for the share of ex-
penditure. Furthermore, when focusing on the most affected households, the PPML
estimates become smaller in magnitude and remain highly insignificant. The effects for
male clothing are also of the wrong sign (positive) and highly insignificant. To contrast this
with WB, whose estimated effects imply an increase in female clothing expenditure of ap-
proximately þ22% and a –43% fall in male clothing expenditure, our respective estimates
are þ14.5%, and þ4.7%.
One explanation for the contrast with the 1970s reforms is the dramatic fall in the price
of clothing seen in recent decades, potentially making decisions regarding clothing expend-
iture less contentious.10 Also, changed shopping patterns may have contributed to clothing
expenditure becoming less contentious. Whereas in the 1970s clothing and footwear would
be purchased in specialist shops requiring a journey to a town centre and the participation
of both parents, by the early 2000s low-income households would be accustomed to buying
clothing and footwear at the supermarket as part of a regular shopping trip. If women were
already making most of these expenditure decisions prior to 2003, then the reforms might
be expected to have little impact on expenditure patterns on these items.11
Interestingly, the estimated signs for both cosmetics and takeaway meals are in line with
the earlier child benefit results of Ward-Batts. The estimates of the tax credit reform in this
paper are, however, small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, excluding the take-
away meals results for expenditure shares for the high-treatment intensity sample. One ex-
planation for the smaller effects for takeaway meals in this paper could be the rise of cheap,
quick-to-prepare meals and pre-prepared vegetables. This has reduced the time inputs
required in the production of home cooked meals and has created a cheap alternative to
takeaway meals.
One concern is that while more resources are predicted to be devoted to the most
strongly preferred female goods (such as children’s goods), offsetting spending reductions
in male-preferred public goods may still impose a child development cost, if they are
goods which the whole family consumes. We therefore extend the previous literature to
consider two such goods, spending on the home and spending on holidays, in panel B of
Table 4.
For holiday spending, negative effects are found in the PPML models with and without
controls. While the effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero in the main sample,
they grow in absolute magnitude when focusing on the most highly-treated households in
columns 5–8, and become statistically significant. The PPML results in column 2 imply a
decrease in holiday spending due to the reform of -27.2%. The inclusion of controls makes
little difference to the estimated coefficients and tends to improve the precision somewhat.
The pattern for the spending shares reinforces the finding with negative and statistically sig-
nificant effects in the restricted sample, both with and without controls.
10 For example, whilst clothing and footwear expenditure accounted for approximately 12% of
household expenditure in LPW, the same figure for this paper is 5%.
11 An alternative explanation could be a lack of statistical power, although we are able to detect re-
form effects in a number of other spending areas that follow.
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For the final collectively consumed good, particularly strong effects are found. The
PPML estimates in column 2 imply an increase in spending on home improvements of
108.6%. The estimate is robust to the inclusion of the controls, falling a little in magnitude,
but remaining statistically significant at the 1% level. The high treatment intensity sample
gives further support to this finding, with the preferred estimate implying a statistically sig-
nificant effect of a similar magnitude. Finally, the results for the expenditure shares also
line up, and we see positive statistically significant reform effects in both samples, which
are again robust to the inclusion of controls to the model.
A way to make sense of the findings for holidays and home improvement expenditure
follows from the discussion in Section 3.2, where couples face a positive probability of di-
vorce. The male partner puts less weight on spending from which a large part of the benefits
accrue in a period in which he may not be a member of the household (home improve-
ments) and puts greater weight on spending where benefits are realized immediately (holi-
day spending).
In summary, the evidence presented in Table 4 indicates that redirecting tax-credit in-
come from fathers to mothers leads to important changes to the quantity of resources that
low-income households devoted to specific items of expenditure. In terms of the private
adult goods, we see evidence of reductions in expenditure on gambling and maintenance
payments, but interestingly and in contrast to earlier reforms, no effect for adult clothing
expenditures. The new evidence presented here suggests a trade-off in expenditure between
goods that are consumed by the whole family—increases are observed for spending on
home improvements but reductions are seen in holiday spending. The latter result could be
rationalized if the incentives to invest in the different collectively-consumed household pub-
lic goods vary by sex.
6.2 Child spending
We are particularly interested to know how directing benefit income to women may affect
spending on children’s goods. Table 5 repeats the empirical exercise of the previous section
for the child spending items. The table indicates that following the 2003 tax credit reform,
low income households increased their expenditures relative to the control group in some
areas of child spending. Both the PPML results for the full sample and the models for ex-
penditure shares imply an increase in weekly expenditure on toys and games that is statistic-
ally significant. Further strength is given to the finding with the inclusion of controls to the
models where the effects remain statistically significant. For the smaller high treatment in-
tensity sample, the estimates are of a similar magnitude excluding the PPML with controls,
where the effects are slightly larger but less precisely estimated. As with some of the earlier
results for the private adult goods, the finding for toys and games mirrors that of WB for
the 1970s child benefit reforms, where positive spending increases on toys were found of a
similar magnitude (approximately 29% in both WB and our estimate in column 2).
Cunha and Heckman (2008) consider ownership of musical instruments as a measure of
parental child investments. We estimated separate reform effects for musical instrument
spending and find a result that lines up with the toys and games finding. That is, we find
evidence of statistically significant spending increases on musical instruments following the
introduction of the new tax credits in 2003.
To comment on the remaining items in the table, for fruit and vegetables, the preferred
PPML estimates are positive, but never statistically significant. For the remaining items, the
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estimates are highly insignificant and not suggestive of an effect on household spending pat-
terns. This includes the case of children’s clothing, and matches with the result of no reform
effect on adult clothing from the previous section. WB found an effect of approximately
24% for children’s clothing expenditure, whereas our estimate is a statistically insignificant
-5%. As documented in Section 5, the ratio of child (and women) to male clothing spending
in the sample period of this paper is much more favorable to children (and women) than in
the period of the 1970s reforms, and taken together with the estimated effect here, it sug-
gests that clothing spending decisions are less contentious in the current period.
In summary, this section has presented evidence that introducing CTC leads low-income
households to allocate greater resources to important areas of child spending but not for
children’s clothing. Despite this difference with the LPW and WB studies, the picture
emerging is similar, with spending increases found for toys and games. We also find in-
creases in spending on musical instruments.
6.3 Female labour supply
We have so far argued that redirecting benefit income from males to females is the key fea-
ture of the 2003 reform. But if there were labour supply responses to the reform, then this
could provide an alternative explanation for the observed changes in spending patterns.
Previous studies suggest that male labour supply is insensitive to changes in financial incen-
tives (see Meghir and Phillips 2010) but female labour supply can be responsive. No pub-
lished work has estimated the labour market impact of the new tax credits, but we point to
three pieces of evidence against a female labour supply interpretation.
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Fig. 2 Labour market trends for females in couples with children
Source: Labour Force Survey 1999–2006 (Oct–Dec). Sample: women in couples with dependent chil-
dren. Highly-educated: highest qualification is at least a degree or equivalent. Low educated: highest
qualification is less than a degree or equivalent.
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First, the reform did not target labour supply, and the incentive changes involved are
very small (see the changes in total tax credit income in Fig. 1). Brewer (2003) looks at the
impact of the reform on work incentives and comments that ‘ . . . . . . low-earning families
with children generally receive higher incomes both in and out of work. This improves the
financial gain to working compared with not working for some and reduces it for others.
Most of these changes, though, are relatively small in magnitude.’ Indeed, the fact that
there was no expected labour market response may explain the absence of any empirical
work estimating the labour market impact of the reform.
Second, using the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS), Fig. 2 presents female labour market
trends centered around 2003. The figure shows trends in employment and hours of work
by education level for females in couples with children. If the reform had a female labour
market impact then we would expect this to show up for the lower-educated group (who
are more likely than the higher-educated to be receiving state benefits and so more likely to
be affected by the reform) following 2003. The employment rate for the low-educated
women is stable at around 69% across the full period (2000–2007) and there are no
obvious discontinuities in the series at 2003. We do observe a small fall in weekly work
hours for the low-educated women from a mean of 23.2 hours in the pre-reform years to
22.7 hours in the post-reform period. However, this small fall in hours of work is matched
for the group of highly-educated women (who are much less likely to receive tax credits),
suggesting that this change is not driven by the reform but rather by macro economic fac-
tors affecting both groups equally.
Third, our methodology allows us to directly test for responses in female labour supply
and hours of work, and the estimated effects are small and highly insignificant. Our esti-
mated employment effect is 0.019 with a standard error of 0.030; for weekly hours worked
the estimated effect is -0.136 with a standard error of 0.112, which we interpret as evidence
against a female labour supply response.
7. Conclusions
This paper has empirically examined whether paying welfare benefits to women instead of
men can influence household spending; it does this by exploiting a UK reform in 2003 that
caused an exogenous transfer of tax credit income in couples from men to women. Our pri-
mary finding is that the reform caused low-income households to reallocate spending.12
LPW, reprised in WB, consider a UK child benefit reform in the late 1970s that caused a
wallet-to-purse transfer of a similar magnitude to the reform examined in this paper, which
took place at the start of the 21st century. LPW find that the ratio of women’s to men’s,
and children’s to men’s clothing expenditures are both found to increase following the child
benefit changes. We find clothing effects that are much smaller in magnitude and statistic-
ally insignificant. Indeed, we note that the ratio of women (and child) to male clothing
spending is higher in the current paper, potentially meaning that household decisions re-
garding clothing expenditure have become less contentious. One implication of this finding
is that research that has traditionally relied on children’s and female clothing expenditures
as indicators of female spending power will become more difficult over time.
12 The UK Government is planning a further round of welfare simplification with the aim of a single
‘Universal Credit’ replacing six existing benefits, including WTC/CTC, by 2017. In couples, the
Universal Credit will be paid to a ‘nominated person’, not necessarily the mother.
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Our second key finding, which is consistent with the 1970s results of WB, is that direct-
ing benefits to women increases spending on children (toys and games, musical instru-
ments). This evidence points to a model of household decision making that must deliver the
feature of greater spending on children’s goods when income is placed in the hands of
women, and this must be robust to the observed changes over time in female labour force
participation.
Our third result is of an apparent trade-off in spending on goods that are collectively
consumed. We find that the exogenous transfer of tax credit income from men to women
leads to households increasing spending on home improvements, but decreasing spending
on holidays. Insofar as these are two goods that are collectively consumed, it makes the
overall impact of targeting benefits to women on child consumption less clear.
An interpretation of the housing and holiday spending findings rests on the fact that the
gains from marriage may be captured by one person if the marriage breaks down
(Stevenson 2007). The male partner, knowing that he may not be a member of the house-
hold in future periods, will prefer expenditures to be on items where the benefits are imme-
diate (e.g., holidays) rather than on items from which the benefits may last for several
years, that is, into periods in which he might no longer be a member of the household
(e.g., home improvements). This interpretation suggests that research that looks for effects
of intra-household transfers on household spending could use the collectively-consumed
goods as an alternative to the adult and children’s clothing expenditures, that as docu-
mented above, are less likely to be effected by intra-household transfers over time.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material (Appendices 2–6) is available online at the OUP website.
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Appendix 1: robustness checks
This appendix contains details of seven robustness checks performed, and Table A.1 sum-
marizes the results of these checks. Full tables of results from the robustness checks are
available in the supplementary material (Appendix 6).
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Robustness check 1—placebo reform: A concern that the main expenditure findings are
driven by differences in unobservables across the male net earnings groups or are due to
chance is further addressed by performing a placebo reform. The treated group consists of
families in the second quartile of the male net earnings distribution who are unaffected by
the reform; families in the top half of the male net earnings distribution form the control
group.13 To comment on the main findings, all of the estimated coefficients (PPML with
controls) for the adult, child, and collectively consumed household goods are statistically
insignificant. This is strong evidence against the hypothesis that the main results are driven
by differences in trends across the control and treatment groups or are due to chance.
Robustness check 2—less treated control group: The reform effect is identified from dif-
ferences in the intensity of treatment. To better focus the control group on households un-
affected by the reform, this robustness check removes the lowest income households from
the control group. The control groups is defined as households with male earnings between
percentiles 30 and 75. The associated cost is that, under this definition, the treatment and
control groups differ more in terms of their characteristics.
Robustness check 3—male partner in at least eligible employment: A sample restriction
is imposed that attempts to remove households from the treated group, which does not ex-
perience a wallet-to-purse transfer. The sample is restricted to households in which the
male partner is in tax credit eligible employment—that is, reports working at least 16 hours
Table A1. Summary of statistically significant effects in robustness checks
Robustness Check: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Parent Goods
Women’s Clothes 
Men’s Clothes 
Cosmetics and Related 
Takeaway Meals    
Gambling   
Maintenance Payments   
General Household Goods
Holiday       
Home Improvements       
Child Goods
Children’s Clothing 
Fresh Fruit/Vegetables 
Childcare 
Books, Newspapers, Magazines 
Toys and Games    
Musical Instruments       
Notes: indicates a statistically significant reform effect (10% level);  indicates a statistically insignificant re-
form effect in the placebo reform. Models are the preferred PPML estimates with controls and from the high
treatment intensity sample.
13 Typically in a DID setting, it would be informative to perform placebo reforms outside of the sam-
ple period for the main construction of treatment and control groups. However, changes to the
EFS survey and numerous other reforms taking place outside the main estimation period (e.g., the
introduction of WFTC in 1999), mean that such tests are uninformative.
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per week. In this way, households where the female has sole entitlement to receive tax
credit payments are removed from the sample.
Robustness check 4—low-income control group: One may worry that the control and treat-
ment groups do not experience the same proportional response to price and income shocks as
assumed by the exponential specification. This robustness check restricts the control group to
couples that are more similar in their income levels to the treated group. Specifically, the con-
trol group is restricted to include couples only in the second quartile of the male net labour in-
come distribution. The cost of this restriction is a loss of sample size and precision.
Robustness check 5—excluding observations seven months prior to the reform: Applicants
to WFTC after August 2002 received payment as a direct benefit payment, until the implemen-
tation of the reform in April 2003. To check the sensitivity of the results to this transition, ob-
servations in the seven months prior to the reform are dropped from the estimation sample.
Robustness check 6—differential linear trends: The main estimation sample includes two
pre-reform and three post-reform years of data, raising the possibility of controlling for differen-
tial treatment/control trends, albeit in a restrictive manner. If the linear specification is the ap-
propriate one, then including these terms should not affect the estimated reform effects.
Robustness check 7—multiple hypothesis testing adjustment: This test implements the
Benjamini et al. (2006) procedure to control the false discovery rate at 20 %.
Appendix 4 (supplementary material) argues that the main results are not driven by un-
equal income growth across the groups.
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